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THE TWIN TEMPTATIONS OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 
STEFAN KNUDSEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over two hundred years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville made an 
analogy between nations and people. De Tocqueville claimed that 
if we are to understand a given person or country, we should not 
study them as grown, mature entities but begin "higher up," for the 
"entire man is, so to speak, to be seen in the cradle of the child."' 
Legal movements also fit this description. For example, the Law 
and Economics movement ("L&E")—like nations and people—has 
distinct origins with equally distinct contours. In Tocquevillian 
terms, the "vices and virtues" of L&E are to be understood and 
evaluated, not only in their present state, but also within the origin 
and history of L&E.2 
Economics is an important field of study for any society. A 
discussion of law in society necessarily bears on economics, and 
vice versa. At its core, modern day economics informs us about 
what is an efficient allocation of scarce resources, and L&E 
prescribes how the law should respond in light of such 
phenomena.3 These efforts have given the legal community new 
lenses through which to see social interactions and new criteria by 
which to evaluate these interactions. Economics illuminates the 
study and practice of law, and any treatment of L&E would be 
incomplete were it only to showcase its worst possibilities, 
especially in view of L&E's contributions to a better understanding 
of antitrust law,4 due process,5 tort liability,6 and "new-to-law" 
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Washington University School of Law. 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 26 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Everyman's Library 1994) (1840). 
2 Id. at 31. 
3 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88-115 (1981) [hereinafter 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 
(6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]. 
4 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 217, 218 (2010); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX (1978). 
5 Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process 
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990). 
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topics, such as transaction costs, moral hazard, and externalities.7  
At this stage of American jurisprudence, it is difficult to imagine 
an area of law unchanged by L&E.8 
This Note illustrates that L&E was troubled in its origin, and 
that those troubles remain. Specifically, as the study of economics 
evolved, it departed from the study of political economy and the 
greater concerns for society and was transformed into an inquiry of 
efficiency alone.9 In so doing, greater legal relevancy was traded 
for empirical certainty. 
This Note also addresses the fundamental problems of L&E as 
inextricably interwoven with its utilitarian heritage. It argues that 
L&E is part of a movement that tempts jurists to reach for science 
and empirical knowledge in an attempt to import certainty and 
perfection into legal rules. This is not good for the study and 
practice of law. 
At present, the L&E movement dwarfs other jurisprudential 
movements and its influence extends beyond the legal academy 
into positive law. While L&E has provided new lenses through 
which to view some legal problems, other incarnations like the 
myth of homo economicus10 are being called into question, in part, 
because recent research has revealed a more complete picture of 
what animates human decisions." Legal scholarship must 
recognize this. 
Finally, as an alternative to these misuses of L&E, this Note 
advocates for Adam Smith's traditional notions of justice and 
virtue ethics, a more restrained application of L&E to primarily 
6 
 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); John P. 
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973). 
7 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and 	 Seriously: Before, During, 
and After "The Law," 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 568-70 (2007). 
8 ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009); Richard Epstein, Law 
and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 
(1997). 
9 EKELUND & HERBERT, infra note 14, at 314. 
I° See Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for 
the Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 186, 
193 (2005) (citing MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1971) (Olsen 
is one of the more recent analysts to use the term)). 
I ' Homo economicus is a device or model created to describe the operations of 
people though the economic lens. See generally MORAL MARKETS, infra note 
156. 
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market transactions,'2 and a renewed focus on law and 
economics. I3 
I. PROBLEMS WITH UTILITARIANISM: PAST AND PRESENT 
A. A Brief History of Economic Inquiry 
In order to fully understand and discuss modern L&E, we must 
first briefly explore the history of economic inquiry. The evolution 
of economics from its philosophical origins to an empirical 
scientific discipline is important to the analysis of this Note.' 
1. Greek Philosophy 
The ancient Greek philosophers wrote about exchanges and 
value in terms of political economy rather than those of modern 
economics. Plato's writings on the benefits of private property and 
specialized labor created a paradigm for later writers.'' 
Aristotle's writing had an even greater impact by influencing 
medieval thinkers, who in turn had a profound influence on later 
economists, such as Adam Smith.I6 The Aristotelian contribution 
most germane to this paper is the two-pronged concept of justice: 
corrective and distributive.I7 However, modern economists find 
little value in Aristotle's work because his inquiry accounted for 
the whole of society's concerns instead of market mechanics alone. 
One finds the ever-present themes of the telos, or the end of a 
thing, and eudaimonia, or the good life, permeating Aristotle's 
writings. In addition to linking economic phenomena to the deeper 
questions of how individuals and society should operate, Aristotle 
also forced the debate over a theory of value. While Aristotle has 
12 Ronald Coase was in favor of keeping L&E within the scope of market 
transactions. John F. Pfaff, PIONEERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 148 (Lloyd R. 
Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2009) [hereinafter PIONEERS]. 
13 This is the perspective of Richard Epstein. Id. at 203-221. See also Epstein, 
supra note 8. 
" ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT F. HERBERT, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY AND METHOD 3, 6 (Bonnie E. Lieberman ed., 2d ed. 1983). 
15 Id. at 2-7. 
16 JOHN MEDAILLE, THE VOCATION OF BUSINESS 42, 49 (2007). 
17 In its simplest form, distributive justice concerns a person's "share" of the 
benefits of society and benefit-conferring regime in place, whereas corrective 
justice is that which rectifies private transactions. Much could be, and indeed 
has been, written on these two concepts. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN 
ETHICS (Martin Oswald trans., Prentice Hall 1999). See also MEDAILLE, supra 
note 16, at 39. 
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been criticized for an ignorance of market functions,18 he 
influenced economic theorists through the nineteenth century. I9 
2. Adam Smith 
Adam Smith ushered in the era of modern economic analysis 
by attempting to discover a "Newtonian" principle for 
economics—like the law of gravity for physics—that would reduce 
a complex field of study to a simple principle.2° Much to Smith's 
chagrin, the attempt yielded two principles. ` 1 Smith's labor theory 
of value and the "invisible hand" began to test the boundaries of 
Aristotle's twin theories of justice. The labor theory of value, 
referred to as the "liberal reward of labor," concerned the same sort 
of equity interests involved in distributive justice and expounded 
on the conflicts that Smith perceived between merchants and the 
labor (or land-owning) classes.22 
Conversely, Smith's "invisible hand" theory relied on 
corrective justice—justice in the exchange—and resolved the 
ancient philosophical problem of self-interest and the public 
interest. By bargaining, people obtain "the far greater part of those 
good offices which we stand in need of."23 In other words, fair 
exchange is achieved by appealing not to our need but to the gain 
18 Even these criticisms are arguably unfair because Aristotle's main concern 
was not with precise market mechanisms, but with broader concerns of society. 
Furthermore, these critics ignore how Aristotle's thoughts on scarcity and value 
helped pave the way for modern economics. MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 39-49. 
19 William Stanley Jevons attributed some of his later work to Aristotle as late as 
the 1870s. EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 16, 312-24. 
20 MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 47. 
21 For a good discussion of labor theory of value and self-interest (invisible 
hand), see MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 44-50. 
22 Common misconceptions of the complexity of Smith, especially in the context 
of his first work, Theory of Moral Sentiments, are typified by his distrust of 
mercantile interests. While he is often best remembered for the "invisible hand," 
that term is only used once in Wealth of Nations, unlike the frequently used 
"liberal reward of labor." Furthermore, Smith rejected utility as an element of 
price. Instead he writes about the "flourishing and happy" society more 
reminiscent of the Aristotelian notion of the eudaimonia, or the "good life." 
MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 46; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 88 (Edwin Carman ed., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1976) (1776) [hereinafter WEALTH OF NATIONS]; ADAM SMITH, 
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776). 
23 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 22, at 88; see also MEDAILLE, supra note 
16, at 49 (this notion of self-interest was not synonymous with "selfishness," but 
should be understood more along the lines of scholastic thinkers—in relation to 
one's station in life and responsibility to family). 
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of the other party, which—incidentally—is mutually beneficia1.24 
The era that followed Smith was defined by a flurry of change and 
development within (or against) the paradigms of his Wealth of 
Nations. 
3. Jeremy Bentham 
Bentham produced a vast amount of literature on the topics of 
law, morals, and economics.25 For the purposes of this Note, his 
most powerful and enduring ideas were the principle of utility in 
general interest, the Felicific calculus, and a narrow view of what 
animates human behavior.26 
Bentham thought that all human behavior was subject to two 
masters: pain and pleasure.27 This was consistent with the then-
prevailing understanding of self-interest, also called utility.28  
Bentham thought the interest of the individual should to be 
compared with that of the general interest of society—the sum of 
individual utilities.29 Utilitarianism combined the two towards the 
moral goal of achieving "[t]he greatest happiness for the greatest 
number."3°  
Bentham's moral arithmetic found expression in the Felicific 
calculus, which used a handful of factors of pain.31 The calculation 
of welfare required the evaluation of acts by their tendency to 
increase or decrease general utility and, as a result, promoted 
whichever law produced the greatest happiness.32 Measurement of 
welfare was an initial problem, and still is, but to a lesser extent 
given the development of modern statistics and economics. 
Bentham's view of human nature and motivation was 
influenced in part by his pain-pleasure principle. He saw people as 
rational pleasure-seekers, which provided an explanation for each 
and every human act—conscious or otherwise.33  
24 WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 22, at 88; see also MEDAILLE, supra note 
16, at 49. 
25 Interestingly, many of his works were never published. 
26 EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 108-12. 
27 Id. at 108 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789)). 
28 Id. at 108; MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 20. 
29 EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 109. 
3° Id. 
31 Id. at 110. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 112. 
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4. Nassau Senior and William Stanley Jevons 
In line with Bentham, Nassau Senior focused on making 
economics a purely scientific discipline. According to Senior, this 
science should be grounded in "a very few general propositions, 
the result of observation, or consciousness, and scarcely requiring 
proof."34 From this, Senior derived his four "scientific" 
principles.35  
Despite Smith's groundbreaking Wealth of Nations and the 
"scientific" approach of Senior and others, the utility and labor 
theory of value did not provide a coherent concept of pricing. The 
answer was marginal utility. While several towering figures of 
economic thought developed this idea around the same time,36 
Jevons, apparently unaided, discovered it first.37 
Jevons did not depart from Bentham's work. He refined it by 
scrapping any pretension of measuring utility directly; Jevons 
asserted that utility would be revealed by behavior.38 Jevons wrote, 
"I have attempted to treat economy as a calculus of pleasure and 
pain and have sketched out . . . the form which the science must 
ultimately take."39 This only makes sense premised on the notion 
that people act as "marginal" pleasure or utility maximizers. The 
Newtonian principle of economics had been discovered, opening 
economic inquiry to the tools of math and statistics. Even Jevons 
remarked that a "perfect system of statistics . . . is the only . . . 
obstacle in the way of making economics an exact science," even 
"as exact as many of the physical sciences."49 This "marginalist 
revolution" would undergo changes not important to this Note, 
except that the revolution would be virtually complete in the 
34 Id. at 136; MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 59. 
35 "[A]lL men desire more wealth with as little sacrifice as possible; Malthus's 
law of population; industrial production can be indefinitely increased; farm 
production . . . is subject to diminishing returns." MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 
59 (paraphrasing Senior); see id. at 137. See also id at 59 (Medaille criticizes 
how Senior wraps the mantle of science around these four postulates because 
they do not provide principles to evaluate, but rather are arbitrary and 
6
prescriptive). 
 Leon Walras (1834-1910), Carl Menger 
(1842-1924). MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 6 
37 EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 3 
38 
 Jevons wrote that Bentham's ideas are 
MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 64. 
39 Id. 
40 Id at 67. 
(1840-1921), and Alfred Marshall 
3. 
12. 
"the starting point of this work." 
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Chicago and Austrian schools of economics of the twentieth 
century.41  
B. Origins of Economics in Law 
1. John Austin 
While economic inquiry began before Jeremy Bentham, it was 
he who founded the modern synthesis of economics and law.42 
Following Bentham's lead, John Austin purged all notions of 
morals or ethics from legal inquiry in order to make it a 
"scientifically respectable body of fact, the sin qua non of 
inquiry."43 As with Bentham, Austin and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
were members of the intellectual zeitgeist of positivism in social 
thought, a movement attributable to thinkers such as August Comte 
who desired to bring law into the realm of "empirical science 
[thereby] freeing all human knowledge from traditional and 
unverifiable assumptions of religion and metaphysics."'" This 
movement desired to take law from superstition to certainty, 
epistemologically speaking. 
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Holmes was a student of Austin—though not a disciple—and 
would later reject some of Austin's bolder legal claims.45 That 
said, it was within Austin's paradigm that Holmes's jurisprudence 
would take shape,' such as his assertion that in "the rational study 
of law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the 
41 Id at 80-83. It should be noted that Austrians and Chicagoans are not classical 
Benthamites. EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 500. 
42 FREDERIC ROGERS KELLOGG, FORMATIVE ESSAYS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 17-22 
(1984). While others, such as Joseph Priestly and Cesare Baccaria, are rightly 
included, it was Bentham who took their ideas to the next level in terms of 
synthesis and ardently advocating legal change. 
 "It was as imperative as using clean test tubes in a laboratory." KELLOGG, 
supra note 42, at 5. 
44 "[Austin and Holmes] were members of an intellectual movement whose 
mission was . . . to advanc[e] the cause of empirical science and free[] all human 
knowledge from traditional and unverifiable assumptions of religion and 
metaphysics." Id at 4. 
45 Id at 9-10. 
46 "The basic landscape forming the background of Holmes's thought, painted 
on a canvas of Comtean positivism, was Bentham's analysis of the law, 
legislation, and the principle of utility, for these gave form to John Austin's 
jurisprudence and the long-to-endure school of legal positivism." Id. at 5; see 
generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). 
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man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of 
economics."4 Taking this notion further, Holmes wrote: 
I look forward to a time when the part played by 
history in the explanation of dogma shall be very 
small, and instead of ingenious research we shall 
spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to 
be attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a 
step toward that ideal it seems to me that every 
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of 
economics. The present divorce between the schools 
of political economy and law seems to me an 
evidence of how much progress in philosophical 
study still remains to be made." 
But the logical extensions of relying on the science of 
economics to furnish the truest and best answers are revealed by 
Holmes's discussion of tort law, which is strikingly similar to the 
L&E analysis that would emerge over seventy years later. This 
theory evolved, for want of logical end, into one of asserting that 
"the economic value even of a life to the community can be 
estimated," with recovery capped at that sum, and that "some day 
in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating, on a higher plane, 
the tariff for life and limb which we see in the Leges 
Barbarorum."49 No doubt this "higher plane" is one of economics. 
C. Modern Law and Economics 
It is this higher plane, now known as modern L&E, to which 
we turn our attention. It must be mentioned at the outset, however, 
that in any field of academic inquiry as large and involved as L&E, 
there is bound to be a difference of opinions over even the 
fundamentals. An attempt has been made to provide a general 
description of the main concepts that form its basic intellectual 
structure. 
47 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) 
(emphasis added). 
48 Id. at 474 (emphasis added). Note the pragmatism of justifying means to ends 
coupled with an increased reliance on economic analysis. 
49 1d. at 467. 
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1. Ronald Coase—Origins of L&E 
This structure is fairly considered to begin with Ronald 
Coase's work, The Problem of Social Cost, which brought the 
economic reality of externalities to the legal context.50 Coase is 
also a good example of one who, instead of creating a closed 
system or "grand thesis" of L&E, made the interesting claim (now 
called the Coase Theorem) that "if transaction costs are zero, the 
allocation of legal entitlements will not stand in the way of an 
efficient allocation of resources."51 The principle was simple: 
"everything has costs: [t]here is a cost to liability [approaches] of 
shifting entitlements, and there is also a cost to any other way of 
doing it."52 
This was to be the powerful paradigm with which Guido 
Calabresi, Gary Becker, Richard Posner, and others would create a 
grand framework that would shift the L&E approach to "the 
economic analysis of law."53 The general assumptions for this 
approach were broadened, asserting that people "are rational utility 
maximizers in all areas of life" in a world "in which resources are 
limited in relation to human wants."54 
However, this Note argues that within the L&E movement lies 
a tacit form of utilitarianism, the misuse of which presents grave 
dangers for the study and practice of law because it is premised on 
a misunderstanding of human anthropology and requires a 
redefinition of justice. 
This next section will focus on two sub-movements of L&E as 
typified by three distinguished scholars: Judge Richard A. Posner, 
Louis Kaplow, and Steven Shavell. Judge Posner is of the wealth-
maximizing movement, has been affectionately called the "dean of 
modem law and economics scholars,"55 and holds the distinction of 
being one of the most cited legal scholars of all time.56 Kaplow and 
50 Coase, supra note 6. 
51 PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 227. 
52 Id. at 29 (citing Guido Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the 
Cathedral, 106 YALE L. J. 2201, 2206 (1997)). 
53 PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 145-46, 224. See generally, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW, supra note 3; GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
(2d ed. 1971); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
54 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
55 
 PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 29. 
56 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 419-
26 (2000) (Judge Posner overshadows the next most-cited author, Ronald 
Dworkin, by over 4,000 citations, although there has been some debate about 
Shapiro's methodology, and presumably not all citations are L&E-related). See 
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Shavell have also been enormously influential in a relatively short 
amount of time and appear to represent the next generation of legal 
analysts with their progression of normative economics into 
welfare economics.57 
2. Richard Posner— Wealth Maximization 
When the word "utilitarian" is used in conjunction with an idea 
or belief one holds to be true, the tendency of most is to either 
distinguish utilitarianism on some grounds or to unflinchingly 
admit the connection. Judge Posner takes the former option. After 
pointing out Bentham's pain-pleasure and rationality principles, he 
criticizes Bentham for the "sponginess" of utility to guide policy, 
empirical shortcomings, and belief in the "plasticity" of human 
nature and institutions.58 Posner then preempts the attack from 
those who would compare his view with utilitarianism by 
criticizing utilitarianism and attempting to distance his alternative 
morality, "wealth maximization," from it.59 
Judge Posner also chooses the "positive" economics of wealth 
maximization because it is a better rule, not because the 
premises—which his theory and utilitarianism share—necessarily 
lead in opposite directions.6° After a harsh critique of 
utilitarianism, Judge Posner's basis for evaluating the lack of 
logical boundary is "conventional moral notions," but nowhere in 
this discussion does he mention the content or origins of that 
tradition.6I Judge Posner then points out the shortcomings of 
Kantianism, namely that it is as logically indefinite as 
utilitarianism and eventually merges into utilitarianism by creating 
exceptions to absolutes.62 
also Commemorating Twenty-five Years of Judge Richard Posner, 74 U. CHI. L. 
REV. (Special 2007) (special issue dedicated to Judge Posner). 
57 PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 267. 
58 "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure . . . they govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think." 
"Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all men 
calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does not calculate." ECONOMICS 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 42 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON 
GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 293-94 (W. Harrison ed., 1948)). 
59 ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 47-114. 
60 Id at 48. 
61 After creating a hypothetical situation where utilitarianism would condone 
murder, Posner, presumably appealing to the shared values of the reader, claims 
that, "to call the murderer . . . a 'good man' does unacceptable violence to 
conventional moral notions." Id. at 57. 
62 Id. at 50-59. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/4
The implication is that neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism is 
sufficient. Posner's answer is the ethic of wealth maximization, 
which is a "blend" of competing philosophies.63 While wealth is 
related to utility, Posner argues that it is not a proxy for utility; 
plus, the theory enjoys the added elements of consent and 
individual autonomy while maintaining its empirical rigor.64 At the 
outset, it is important to note that the theme of Posner's argument 
is reminiscent of the style of William James; it is a philosophy that 
"works" or has "cash value."65 By the use of adjectives like 
"adequate," "acceptable," or "attractive," Posner's jurisprudence is 
also similar to the pragmatism of Justice Holmes by implying that 
no true concept of justice is attainable, so we choose the best from 
among competing theories.66 But what standard does he use to 
differentiate the best from the worst? 
In Posner's explanation of why wealth maximization efficiency 
is morally superior to utility maximization, the standard appears to 
be wealth maximization itself: the necklace purchaser who lawfully 
spends $10,000 is morally superior to the necklace thief who 
incurs a disutility of $10,000 because a benefit is conferred to the 
seller, and the productive activity required for the buyer to earn 
$10,000 benefits others. Conversely, the utilitarian would honor 
the disutility of the thief.67 Essentially, the argument states that 
more wealth is promoted by the purchaser than by the thief; 
therefore, the wealth-maximizing rule is morally superior to the 
utilitarian act. 
The same circularity is observed when Posner compares other 
values, such as (1) economic liberty, which is empirically proven 
to "maximize wealth," (2) piety traits of truth-telling and promise-
keeping, which "promote[] trade and hence wealth," and even (3) 
benevolence, which can avoid "costly market and legal processes," 
and presumably increases wealth.68 It is difficult to see how this 
comparison between utilitarianism and wealth maximization is fair. 
Posner claims that maximizing wealth is more morally defensible 
because it provides a "firmer foundation for a theory of distributive 
and corrective justice," and he argues that Aristotle's corrective 
justice "is indeed required by" wealth maximization.69 Normally, 
63 1d at 65. 
64 Id. at 59-74. 
65 See generally WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD 
WAYS OF THINKING (Dover 1995) (1907). 
" KELLOGG, supra note 42, at 14, 49-57. 
67 ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 66. 
68 Id. at 67-68. 
69 Id at 69, 73. 
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scholars defend their theory using some other basis for morality 
and justice, such as utility, Kant, or Aristotle, but outside of the 
economic efficiency of wealth maximization, Judge Posner does 
not appeal to another basis of morality. Rather, this is the blending 
of pragmatism. 
Efficiency remains the overriding, concern for Judge Posner. 
But were it not for the "queasiness"7" of philosophers, the need to 
replace utility maximization with wealth maximization and the 
reasons for Posner's focus on consent and individual autonomy 
become less clear.71 Posner goes to great lengths to distinguish 
wealth maximization from pure utilitarianism. But in light of his 
comparison of the two, is it a difference of kind or degree? This 
question is especially relevant after acknowledging that "wealth 
maximization as an ethical norm gives weight both to utility, 
though less heavily than utilitarianism does, and to consent, though 
perhaps less heavily than Kant himself would have done."72 
In short, wealth maximization is at best a kinder, gentler form 
of utilitarianism, though not entirely distinct.73 But there is no 
logical stopping point inherent in Posner's position—only the 
vague, unexplained backstop of conventional notions of morality, 
which seems to have little to do with the justification of wealth 
maximization as a norm.74 Posner's pragmatism "works," but it is 
only a matter of time before the premises must be taken to their 
logical end. 
3. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell—Welfare Economics 
Some scholars separate themselves from normative economics, 
while others find that wealth maximization is too narrow and argue 
instead for "the encompassing framework of welfare economics." 
In their monumental article, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell 
argue for making welfare economics the standard for evaluating 
rules of law.75 Specifically, wherever adherence to "abstract 
" Id. at 64. 
71 Posner justifies wealth maximization using notions of justice and grounds 
notions of justice in wealth maximization by arguing that "wealth maximization 
is a more defensible moral principle in that it provides a firmer foundation for a 
theory of distributive and corrective justice." Id. at 69. 
72 ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 98. 
73 Id. at 84 (Posner admits that the utility monster of aggregation of interests is 
"a less serious problem," but does not deny that it is a problem). 
74 1d. at 57. 
75 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961 (2001) (over 400 pages and 1,000 footnotes). 
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notions of fairness" would make everyone "worse off," fairness 
should be discarded in favor of an idea that increases welfare.76 
Under their view, the authors make "normative evaluations . . . 
based on the well-being of individuals."77 Their definition of well-
being includes "everything that an individual might value—goods 
and services that the individual can consume, social and 
environmental amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, 
sympathetic feelings for others, and so forth."78 This includes, but 
is not limited to, "hedonistic" pleasure and pain.79 The authors 
claim that "well-being" is more expansive than traditional 
utilitarianism because notions of fairness are also taken into 
consideration, on an empirical level, just as one would consider a 
preference for fine wine.80 What is troubling about the notion of 
"well-being," and the moral weight accorded to it, is that the 
authors claim that all people understand "well-being" innately.81 It 
is difficult to see how well-being is different from utility or 
happiness. But it is easy to see how this is at variance with the 
classical notion of "the good life."82 Without utilitarianism, it is 
difficult to define or justify this notion of well-being. 
After a discussion of well-being, the authors claim that "a 
method of aggregation is of necessity an element of welfare 
economics, and value judgments are involved in aggregating 
different individuals' well-being into a single measure of social 
welfare."83 The authors do not choose one particular method of 
aggregating welfare, be it Rawlsian or utilitarian; they only say 
that it should be "coherent."84 It is this guiding principle—or 
76 The authors are not concerned when notions of fairness comport with 
increasing welfare, only where the two lead to different conclusions. Id. at 970. 
77 M at 979. 
78 Id. at 980. 
79 Id. 
8° Id. at 975, 983. 
81 "[W]e observe that we will usually assume that individuals comprehend fully 
how various situations affect their well-being and that there is no basis for 
anyone to question their conception of what is good for them. Therefore, when 
we say that an individual is better off, there will be no doubt about what we 
mean." Id. at 984. 
82 The classical notion of the good life is action or happiness in conformity to 
virtue, with justice being the greatest comprehension of the virtues, and is 
connected to the ever-present discussion of ends, or telos. A life of leisure, 
amusement, and disregard for others might increase "well-being" as defined by 
the authors, but it would not be the good life. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN 
ETHICS, 16, 17, 286-88 (Prentice Hall 1999). See also J. BUDZISZEWSKI, 
NATURAL LAW FOR LAWYERS 31-34 (2006). 
83 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 75, at 977, 987-88. 84 Id. at 987-88. 
2010] THE TWIN TEMPTATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
	 291 
Washington University Open Scholarship
292 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [vol.. 2.279 
metaprinciple—that is favored over the indefinite, arbitrary notion 
of fairness.85 However, this provides no explanation for why 
principles of fairness should not be allowed to reduce the overall 
"welfare" of society. The implicit explanation is that, for Kaplow 
and Shavell, reducing societal welfare for reasons of fairness 
would be unfair. But this kicks fairness out the front door only to 
smuggle it in through the back. 
Whether dealing with wealth maximization, welfare 
economics, or pure utilitarianism, L&E consists of the same basic 
formula: the view that people are essentially rational maximizers 
responding to stimuli; a calculus to determine some form of 
societal utility; and a normative prescription based on maximizing 
the aggregate utility.86 In history and logic, the different iterations 
are quite similar, and yet the connections are rarely made. 
Moreover, all three share the same basic assumptions about human 
nature and an extreme reliance on empirical data and the scientific 
method, which bring their own problems to the study and practice 
of law. Indeed the most tempting characteristic of L&E is its 
tantalizing promise of certitude through empirical knowledge: 
Suddenly everything looked simpler and clearer 
. . . Economics would tell what was the cheapest. 
Science would tell what might beneficially have 
been avoided . . . Many judges protested that they 
were ill equipped to deal with scientific questions, 
and didn't wish to. But they steadily reoriented law 
towards science anyway. The legal lips murmured 
no, no, to seductions scientific, but the eyes and 
arms said yes.87 
II. EMPIRICISM: THE TEMPTATION OF SCIENCE AND THE 
LAW 
Because L&E arose during a period when knowledge 
determined by the scientific method was valued as superior to all 
85 The authors argue that corrective justice requires compensation for wrongs, 
regardless of impact on welfare, "favor[ing] some types of individuals over 
others based solely on characteristics determined by chance elements that seem 
morally arbitrary from any plausible perspective." The authors further find that 
fairness notions distinguishing between victim and injurer are arbitrary. Id. at 
1006, 1019, 1092. 
86 EICELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 108-12. 
87 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE 12-13 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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other forms of knowledge, as already argued above,88 the quest for 
certitude remains a mainstay of the modern L&E movement.89 
Judge Posner, writing in the first volume of the Journal of Legal 
Studies, remarked that "[our aim] is to encourage the application of 
scientific methods to the study of the legal system. As biology is to 
living organisms, astronomy to the stars, or economics to the price 
system, so should legal studies be to the legal system."9° But why 
is science better (or more useful) in the legal field than other forms 
of knowledge? The answer lies in its claim of truth and certainty. 
As Robin Feldman powerfully argues, the law deals with difficult, 
imprecise matters replete with value judgments creating a distinct 
temptation to export those problems to the experts of science in the 
hopes of then importing elegant rules and perfect results.9I 
A. The Experts 
One problem with grounding legal rules in sophisticated 
empirical theory is that most judges lack the requisite expertise to 
work with intricate economic analysis.92 The result becomes an 
extreme reliance on experts for the deliverance of justice. A similar 
problem was implicated by the Humanitarian theory of punishment 
of the mid-twentieth century. This theory viewed criminal behavior 
as an illness to be cured and deterred, instead of the barbarity of 
punishing criminals based on just deserts. C.S. Lewis wrote that 
retribution should always be a part of the criminal justice concept, 
because it is the only humane way to treat the criminal.93  
First, there is no such thing as a "just deterrent" or a "just 
cure"—the former is to be measured by how well it deters and the 
latter by how well it cures." By rejecting the discussion of what a 
88 See KELLOGG, supra note 42. 
89 As contrasted with the more "old-fashioned" economists such as Ronald 
Coase, who appreciated more the prose form of Adam Smith and applications of 
economics to market scenarios. Coase still considered himself an empiricist, but 
one who also "dismissed econometrics" on the grounds that "if you torture the 
data enough nature will always confess." PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 28 n.9. 
9° FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 19. This is also similar to the fascination of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes with the scientific method. KELLOGG, supra note 42, at 11-14; 
see also Holmes, supra note 47, at 470. 
91  FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 1-10. 
92
1d. at 40-42. 
93 C.S. LEWIS, Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GOD IN THE DOCK 288 
(Walter Hooper, ed.,1970). 
9414. 
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criminal deserves, the Humanitarians have "tacitly removed [the 
criminal] from the sphere of justice altogether."95  
Instead, the criminal is treated as a patient and receives 
treatment until "well." But this consigns the debate of how to deal 
with criminals into the realms of criminology, penology, and 
psychology, which have their own "experts with perfect logic" and 
statistics to prove the efficacy of their methods. 96 By placing this 
debate into the hands of experts of science, the debate is, by 
definition, taken out of the hands of "the rest of us, speaking 
simply as men," which includes lawyers and judges.97 Finally, it is 
crucial to remember that these scientific "cures" are every bit as 
coerced as any other punishment ever devised.98 By redefining 
criminal behavior from badness to illness, we grant the license to 
"treat" the convicted until cured, and at no point along the way can 
one coherently argue that the cure is too severe. 
Analogies to L&E come easily. There is little room for a 
discussion of traditional justice if human behavior is couched in 
terms of efficiency, as Posner does.99 How does one argue with the 
refined empirical studies and sophisticated equations that modern 
economic analysis produces? Not only do some L&E problems 
take the notions of law and justice out of the hands of the common 
person, oftentimes they are taken out of the hands of judges as 
This discussion should not be taken to trivialize the condition 
of individuals who suffer from mental illness. The point is that 
redefining crime as an illness is a reach for the certitude of science, 
to the exclusion of common notions of justice, which has the 
potential to give our rulers "a finer instrument of tyranny than 
95 Ia  
" ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 527 (5th ed. 2008) 
(referencing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Supreme Court upheld 
the use of psychiatric evaluations to predict future criminal conduct in the 
context of a capital murder case)). 
97 LEWIS, supra note 93, at 288-89. Lewis is using the word "men" in gender-
neutral sense, focusing more on the common person with human inclinations 
shared by all. 
98 M at 290. 
" "If a wrongful act results in injury, rectification in some form is necessary if 
the efficiency of resource use is not to be undermined. To be sure, this requires 
equating wrongful with inefficient, an equation Aristotle did not make. But the 
concept . . . is a procedural, rather than substantive idea." ECONOMICS OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 73. But see MORTIMER J. ADLER, SIX GREAT IDEAS 184 
(1981) (Justice between individuals is a substantive concept in the Aristotelian 
tradition). 
10° FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 43. 
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wickedness ever had before."1°1 A similar reach for science is seen 
through redefining justice as that which is efficient.1°2 
The Humanitarian emphasis on deterrence is clearly in 
agreement with the utilitarian approach described above, which is 
accepted or embraced by some commentators who assert that "an 
act should be treated as a crime if doing so increases social 
welfare," and "[t]he crime should be punished to the extent that 
maximizes social welfare."1°3 Such an approach enjoys the 
trappings of science while simultaneously reinforcing the morality 
of "the economic theory of crime in a long tradition of utilitarian 
thought."' 04 
B. The Statistics 
Defining values based on efficiency places an intense pressure 
on the quality of empirical data, and therefore on statistics. Thus, 
the debate over method has become crucial when debating life-
and-death legal norms. Recent debates over the death penalty are 
one example of this phenomenon. The focus has been on whether 
the effect of the death penalty has resulted in a net gain—i.e. 
whether it saves more lives than it takes. Not only does this put 
extreme pressure on the limits and potential for statistics to answer 
questions about what takes place in society and why,1°5 but it 
appears that the debate about what things are (e.g. government 
taking life) is subordinate to whether there is more or less of a 
thing (e.g. life or welfare).106 
1°1 LEWIS, supra note 93, at 293. 
1°2 ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 73. 
103 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 96, at 486. 
I" Id 
1°5 "Whether or not the death penalty has a deterrent effect is—Sunstein and 
Vermeule argue—a very important question. If policymakers are willing to 
debate the issue based on the consequences of capital punishment (as Sunstein 
and Vermeule urge them to do), then it is crucial to try to establish reliable 
evidence on whether executions deter or stimulate crime . . . . [I]t seems 
reasonable to appeal to econometric pyrotechnics. Unfortunately, our survey of 
the literature suggests that too often these pyrotechnics have yielded heat rather 
than light . . . . The only clear conclusion is that execution policy drives little of 
the year-to-year variation in homicide rates. As to whether executions raise or 
lower the homicide rate, we remain profoundly uncertain." John J. Donohue & 
Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 841-43 (2005); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra 
note 96, at 549. 
1°6 Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 105; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 
96, at 549. 
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Sunstein and Vermeule acknowledge these legitimate concerns 
about empirical evidence. The obvious solution is better empirical 
studies—a possibility that is presumed in their article1°7—but they 
stop short of qualifying their views by writing that "[e]ven if better 
data were not available, the 'precautionary principle' should 
suggest that we err on the side of saving victims, presumably at the 
cost of the convicted, because it would at least incapacitate 
convicted murderers from killing again."108 
The argument is simple: if economics, econometrics, and 
statistics can empirically prove that the death penalty deters 
murders from taking place, then the law should honor its moral 
obligation to would-be victims and take the life of the convict.109 
But this is another example of the way in which economic 
language tacitly employs morally evaluative language while 
enjoying the epistemic force of scientific knowledge. It must not 
be forgotten that the underlying empirical studies are economic. 
The logical framework is inescapable even for questions of 
"exchanges" that do not involve a life for a life, such as rape, 
which the authors describe as "most unclear how to think 
about."110 Once the normative foundation is laid, however, the 
unavoidable implication is that when empirical certitude has 
adequately developed, then the policy debates over impassioned 
life-or-death issues are a nullity if a practice is shown to reduce 
crime. HI 
It is not within the scope of this Note to give a full treatment of 
capital punishment. Rather, the discussion of capital punishment 
points out that the authors never discuss what the criminal 
deserves. Cures are evaluated by how well they cure and 
deterrence measures are evaluated by how well they deter.112 
107 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally 
Required?: Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(2005); see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 96, at 549. 
• 108 "Even if we reject strong versions of the precautionary principle, it hardly 
seems sensible that governments should ignore evidence demonstrating a 
significant possibility that a certain step will save large numbers of innocent 
lives." Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 107, at 715, 718. 
109 "To the extent possible, we intend to bracket the most fundamental questions 
and to suggest that whatever one's view of the foundations of morality, the 
objection to the death penalty is difficult to sustain under the empirical 
assumptions that we have traced." Id. at 718. These assumptions include the 
theory that, "like most people, criminals are boundedly rational, assessing 
probabilities with the aid of heuristics." Id. at 714. 
11° Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 107, at 748. 
III John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on 
Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379 (2001). 
112LEMS, supra note 93, at 288. 
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Without appealing to "abstract injunctions against the taking of 
life," how do the authors succeed in saying there is a moral 
requirement to kill the convict to certainly—or even possibly—
save one or more innocent victims?I13 The only possible 
explanation is by fitting deontological moral judgments, and 
obviously consequentialist moral judgments, into utilitarian 
paradigms. 
Sunstein and Vermeule thoroughly avoid questions outside the 
narrow "life for a life" exchange paradigm. But once the debate is 
framed in terms of the cost-benefit analysis of a law's effects, then 
it is difficult to avoid drawing the same conclusion when empirical 
research strongly suggests that a given action significantly lowers 
crime.114 
Much of the cited empirical data utilizes the model of homo 
economicus, which, in addition to the lore and conflict surrounding 
the figure, has come to epitomize the core assumptions of people 
viewed through the economic lens: people are rational and seek 
utility equilibrium—a downward-sloping demand curve.115  That is, 
people are utility (or wealth) maximizing calculators in all areas, 
so in order to produce efficiency, the law should provide the 
"correct" stimuli to promote efficient decisions. This assumption 
about human decision-making relates back to Jevons's study of the 
effects of decisions, but was not employed in the field of law until 
the L&E movement! 16 
C. Homo Economicus, Captain Economicus & Homo Moralis 
1. Margate Shipping 
Lest one doubt the influence of L&E scholarship outside the 
academic context, the federal case of Margate Shipping is 
insightful.117 In the middle of a tropical storm, the captain of the 
Cherry Valley tanker risked the lives of his crew, his ship, 
environmental disaster, and the fate of a large corporation in order 
to aid the five-man crew aboard the distressed tug boat J.A. 
113 Various studies concluded that anywhere from zero to eighteen murders are 
deterred per execution. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 107, at 706, 710-16. 
114 Donohue & Levitt, supra note 111. 
115 PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 149. 
1161d.  
117 Margate Shipping Co. v. MN JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 987-89 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
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Orgeron.118 The Court in Margate Shipping relied heavily on the 
work of influential L&E scholars when it reduced the plaintiff's 
salvage award from trial by over two million dollars.119 The L&E 
model used compressed a broad array of human motivations into 
the confines of homo economicus by imposing a hypothetical 
bargaining scenario between the two parties. 20 
Salvage law is unique. It has no counterpart on land and only 
rewards the salvor for saving the property of the savlee, not human 
life.121 Yet it is widely known, as the Margate Shipping facts 
demonstrate, that mariners save distressed vessels primarily to save 
their crew and passengers. 122 In other words the reward is 
separated from the motivations of the rescuing mariner.123 
In 1994, Tropical Storm Gordon pounded Florida's eastern 
coast with winds up to seventy miles per hour and twenty five-foot 
waves at sea.I24 In the middle of the night, the Orgeron was 
plagued with engine failure and gave the distress signal as it drifted 
towards Bethel Shoals and certain destruction. 25 The Cherry 
Valley tanker was the only vessel remotely close to the Orgeron.I26 
Although captains have a legal obligation to aid ships in trouble, 
that duty ends where doing so would put the potential rescuer in 
danger.127 The Cherry Valley was under absolutely no obligation to 
offer help. At two football fields in length and carrying ten million 
gallons of fuel oil, going anywhere near the shoals during a gale 
was plainly hazardous—and heroic.128 After a herculean effort, the 
tug and barge were secured and, against all odds, the Cherry 
Valley slowly pulled the tug and barge to safety.129 
At no point during the rescue did Captain Prentice Strong, the 
tanker's skipper, ever ask what the tug was transporting.13° Only 
later did he discover that the NASA rockets aboard the barge were 
118 The tug boat was transporting a barge named Poseidon, which was carrying 
rockets for the NASA space shuttle. Id. 
119 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good 
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. 
LEG. STUD. 83 (1978); see Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986-89. 
129 M.B.W. Sinclair, The Cherry Valley Case: How Wrong Can Economists Be 
About Salvage?, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 57, 73 (2006). 
121 Id. at 71. 
122 Id. at 62-63, 71-80. 
123 Id at 71. 
124 Id at 58-59. 
125 Id at 61. 
126 
127 Id at 61-62. 
128 Id at 64. 
129 Id at 64-65. 
138 Id. at 65-66, 79, 93. 
298 	 JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW 	 [VOL. 2.279 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol2/iss2/4
worth millions.13I The Circuit Court used the L&E approach of a 
hypothetical bargain, despite Supreme Court precedent giving trial 
courts the discretion to take into account a broad array of facts 
concerning the values and motivations peculiar to sailors and their 
culture.I32 If these values exist at all they were present in the case 
of Margate Shipping.133 
While the heroism of seafaring men and women is the stuff of 
epic novels, it is no less real today. In fact, our history and laws 
recognize this.I34 The altruistic motives of the actors involved, 
despite being prevalent in seafaring culture (not to mention legally 
significant), was ignored by the Fifth Circuit in favor of a 
hypothetical bargain.I35 This approach imposes an "efficient 
contract" between the parties and is premised upon a perfect 
market, which essentially assumes a competitive industry for 
rescue services where each firm's primary consideration is 
maximization of profits.'36  
Nothing could be further from reality. The Cherry Valley was 
the Orgeron's only hope and indeed saved the tug without 
inquiring about the value.137 But Captain Strong did know the risks 
of attempting the rescue. Had the Cherry Valley lost control and 
run aground along the upscale Florida coastline it would have 
spilled millions of gallons of oi1.138 The tanker's owner, Keystone, 
Inc., would have been bankrupt, ending thousands of careers and 
devastating shareholders.139 Furthermore, he would have 
personally joined the ranks of several "eco-demons," like the 
captain of the Exxon Valdez, not to mention jeopardizing his 
captain license.140 If the salvage value of the cargo—unknown at 
"1  M 
132 Id. at 73-75. 
133 "In The Blackwall, Justice Clifford may have produced a messy and under-
determinate list of factors, but in so doing he gave trial court judges the 
opportunity to take into account motivations, risks, and values." Id; see also 
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1870) 
134 Sinclair, supra note 120, at 73-75. 
135 "The difference in attitude between [the trial and appellate judge] reflects the 
difference between the abstract, otherworldly calculus of law and economics, 
and the real world mariner community. Our historically developed salvage law 
has adapted to better reflect the mariner community's values and ethos. The . . . 
economic analysis illustrates only homo economicus's impoverished spirit . . . . 
If homo economicus models anybody, it certainly does not model those who 
venture to sea in ships." Id. at 94. 
136 Id. at 93. 
137 Id. 
"8  Id. at 76, 80. 
139 Id at 62. 
148 Id at 62, 93. 
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the time—yielded in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the risk 
would have remained "too high." But Captain Strong knew the 
lives of five sailors were at stake and that is all he needed to 
know.ic 
The trial court pranted $6.4 million using the traditional 
salvage calculation.14'The Circuit Court reduced that sum to $4.1 
million dollars under the fiction that a perfect market existed 
during Tropical Storm Gordon.143 The L&E approach, of course, 
aims at "maximize[ing] social utility," and "assumes the purpose 
of the law is to promote economic efficiency."'"  Under the L&E 
approach giving the salvor the entire value of the rescued ship and 
cargo is too high, yet no award is too low.145 So what is efficient? 
The answer is simple: a bargained for contract! Under this regime 
many distressed sailors will be saved, but not too many, because 
after all that would be inefficient.I46 This is no doubt easy for the 
"armchair empiricist" to say as they remain safe from Davy 
Jones.147 
Notwithstanding the discussion of this Note thus far it is easy 
to see how arm's-length commercial transactions are potentially 
solved when courts engage in hypothetical bargaining using the 
homo economicus model. But to write "Captain Economicus" into 
a scenario with life on the line, billions at stake, in the middle of a 
gale, and in the face of maritime law history, demonstrates the 
pervasiveness of homo economicus in and its inadequacies outside 
the marketplace.148 The truth is seafaring culture thrives on—and 
perhaps because of—"the mariners' unshakeable code of reciprocal 
altruism" long recognized under maritime law.I49 The L&E 
approach, however, favors the simple elegance of reducing 
everything to a calculation of market values. When L&E holds 
sway under the facts of Margate Shipping then nothing is beyond 
its reach. 
141 Id. at 90-91. 
142 Id. at 50, 70; Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 995. 
143 Sinclair, supra note 120, at 59, 91-92; Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 995. 
144 Sinclair, supra note 120, at 78. 
145 Id at 76, 81. 
146 Id. at 89, 92. 
147 Id 
148 "Imagine . . . saying [to a fellow sailor in distress], `[I]n my calculation of the 
risks here, $6 million won't do. And don't forget, it's you and your crew who are 
about to die; we are just uncomfortable [with the deal] . . . ." This might be the 
approach of "Captain Economicus, [but] it is utterly foreign to mariners. Lives 
are not at stake in the hypothetical bargain, only market values." Id. at 93-94. 
149 Id. at 72-73, 91. 
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2. Homo economicus is obsolete 
An undue reliance on the science of the times is not necessarily 
new in legal theory. Even the learned Oliver Wendell Holmes 
wrote his infamous and regrettable Buck opinion based on the 
prevailing winds of social science—eugenics—which enjoyed all 
the vestiges of the scientific method.15° Also joining Holmes in the 
Buck opinion was Justice Brandeis, who was no stranger to 
incorporating economics and other social sciences into his 
opinions.151 
A reoccurring theme in modern legal thought is that analysts 
wish to draw upon science as a fount of truth (either in method or 
result).152 But they are not generally scientists,153 which then 
converts their reliance on empirical or scientific knowledge into a 
strange sort of faith.154 Put another way: 
Modernism promises knowledge free from doubt, 
metaphysics, morals, and personal conviction; what 
it delivers merely renames as Scientific Method the 
scientist's and especially the economic scientist's 
metaphysics, morals, and personal convictions. It 
cannot, and should not, deliver what it promises. 
Scientific knowledge is no different from other 
personal knowledge. Trying to make it different, 
instead of simply better, is the death of science. 155 
150 "The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that Carrie Buck 'is 
the probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, 
that she may be... sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her 
welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization . . . .' It is better 
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, 
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are 
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 
(1927) (emphasis added). 
151  Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 9 (1996). 
152 FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 120. 
153 Although exceptions to this rule seem to be growing, Shavell and Polinsky 
have PhDs in Economics. PIONEERS, supra note 12, at 267. 
154 FELDMAN, supra note 8, at 34. 
155 MEDAILLE, supra note 16, at 81 (citing D. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of 
Economics, 21 Journal of Economic Literature 481 (June 1983). See also 
EKELUND & HERBERT, supra note 14, at 500 (Friedrich A. Hayek also provides 
clarity on this point with his distinction between scientism and scientific 
inquiry); [1 RULES AND ORDER] FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW LEGISLATION & 
LIBERTY 15-17 (University of Chicago Press 1983). 
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As mentioned before, homo economicus has long been 
questioned—if not outright attacked—but rarely on scientific 
grounds. Recently, however, a two-year study was completed 
concerning the motivations and decisions of people in the 
marketplace.156 This study drew upon many different fields of 
expertise, including neurology and evolutionary biology, in 
addition to philosophy and law. 
The overwhelming consensus of the team who conducted the 
study was that people are morally-oriented by nature and that the 
pursuit of virtue (or homo moralis) does more than play a role in 
decision-making. In fact, it may be the very thing that makes 
markets possible. Homo economicus is a myth. Greed and 
selfishness are not the dominating motivators of human action. 
Instead, character values may very well be the currency in which 
markets trade.157 
Adam Smith saw the value of natural moral sympathy, or 
fellow-feeling, in the Aristotelian sense. With this view in mind, 
the "distinction between self-interest and social-mindedness is all 
but unintelligible."158 This raises serious questions about the end, 
or telos, of business affairs that are deeper than economists are able 
to address. 
These deeper questions are not only for philosophers to 
contemplate. Even the most dedicated economist, econometrician, 
and L&E advocate should consider the evidence of the above 
study, because it bears upon markets in a real way. Without virtue 
in the markets, transaction costs rise to the point of market 
failure.159 Economists who understand more about human nature 
and choices will be able to create more complete concepts of how 
markets truly work. 
The two-year study enlisted experts in neuroscience and 
evolutionary biology who corroborate the Aristotelian view of 
humans as naturally displaying other-regarding behavior. Note that 
even Charles Darwin observed that every "human population has 
essentially the same mental and moral faculties," without which 
society would not be possible.16° 
156 MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. 
Zak ed., 2008) [hereinafter MORAL MARKE TS]. 
157 Ronald J. Colombo, Exposing the Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HARV. J.L. 
& Pus. POL'Y 737, 742-43 (2009). 
158 Robert Solomon, Free Enterprise, Sympathy, and Virtue, in MORAL 
MARKETS, supra note 156, at 35. 
159 Colombo, supra note 157, at 752. 
16° Id. at 746. 
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From a psychological perspective, homo economicus possesses 
all the traits of a sociopath.' Furthermore, people often display 
random altruistic behavior, or refrain from cheating even where the 
risks of apprehension are low. The authors of the study conclude 
that while social values and institutions influence thought and 
behavior, "some moral values appear to be universal and difficult 
to suppress neurologically.11162 For some time virtue ethics and 
natural law advocates have had limited influence with modern 
legal scholars because their foundations are perceived to be either 
entirely religious or socially constructed.163 This needs to change. 
While the study's findings do not necessarily "prove" 
philosophical theories, they do shake the assumptions that have 
long guided economic thinking—especially L&E thinking—and 
cannot be ignored. 
CONCLUSION 
L&E has effectuated a sea change in the way a generation of 
lawyers, law students, and legal scholars understand law. Now that 
the proverbial canon of L&E literature has settled into several 
well-worn paths, it is important to look at where these paths lead to 
and from. Whittling back utilitarianism to wealth maximization or 
expanding utility to include welfare or well-being does not change 
the logical implications of its premises. The history and origin of 
the assumptions underlying L&E are far-reaching and problematic 
and should be reconsidered. As L&E creeps into positive law, it is 
imperative that jurists and scholars resist the temptation to reach 
for empirical certainty as an epistemological life-preserver in the 
ocean of value judgments and imperfection. 
The clean, precise logic of L&E does not change the 
complexity and imprecision of deciding real cases. Furthermore, 
recent scholarship across many disciplines reveals that the 
empirical model of homo economicus serves as a grossly 
incomplete guide to predicting human behavior outside—and even 
inside—the marketplace. The moral virtues that define our 
humanity are the same virtues that might just save our marketplace 
and maintain the integrity of the study and practice of law. 
161 MORAL MARKETS, supra note 156, at 159. 
162 Colombo, supra note 157, at 748. 
163 Gerson Moreno-Riano, Natural Law and Modern Economic Theory, 8 J. 
MARKETS AND MORALITY 387, 388 (2005). 
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